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Blessed is he that maketh 
two ears of grain to grow 
where only one grew before.
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Woe unto them
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- ibid
Inasmuch as ye have done it
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Food Security: and The Right To Food Looking Ahead
Food security is an established human right included in international 
conventions. That is hardly cause for surprise - the right to food is an 
essential component of the right to life. In extreme cases denial of the 
right to food is a death sentence - as in 1992 when in some Somalia refugee 
camps where over 15 children per 1,000 were dying each day. Even at lesser 
levels lack of an adequate diet prevents full mental as well as physical 
development of children and full ability to work hard and long (and 
therefore livelihood) for adults.
But actual enforcement or provision of effective access to food security is 
absent for literally hundreds of millions of persons and scores of millions 
of households. At the peak of the 1992-93 hungry year following the 1991- 
92 Apocalypse Drought, up to 50% of black South Africans (and perhaps 1% of 
white) did lack food sufficiency - in Angola and Mozambique the situation 
was worse and in Zimbabwe only somewhat better.
The reasons for the gap between a largely non-controversial right and its 
massive continued non-achievement in practice are multiple and relate to 
several clusters of people and countries. They do not include any physical 
shortfall of food production at global level and only a handful of cases in 
which national production plus potentially financeable imports could not 
provide an adequate diet. They do include - especially in Africa - many 
cases of low household production (especially in bad weather years) by 
family farmers whose access to food depends on producing it both for 
household provisioning and sale. In all countries they include many 
households with low incomes - aged, handicapped, low skills, handicapped, 
with too high a mouths to hands (dependent to economically active) ratio - 
who do not have access to effective safety nets to augment earned incomes.
2Another large group are the victims of war and civil disorder - refugees, 
internally displaced and other affected persons. At national level there 
are countries which cannot meet the foreign exchange and/or fiscal burdens 
of importing and distributing food to calamity stricken families (e.g. 
Mozambique on both counts and Tanzania on the fiscal one). But perhaps the 
dominant causal factor is lack of high policy priority linked to 
effectively articulated and relatively rapidly and smoothly implemented 
delivery (whether of food or of purchasing power) mechanisms. It is, for 
example, hard to explain South Africa's 1992-93 poorer than Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and Tanzania performance on any other ground than lack of 
adequate political priority.
Food Security; What Do We Mean?
Food security can be defined as assured access to an adequate diet. To 
achieve it requires meeting two overlapping requirements. The first is 
adequate physical supplies of appropriate food at required locations backed 
by a delivery system to maintain flows. The second is an entitlement for 
each household (and household member) to receive adequate food whether by 
producing for self-provisioning, purchasing out of earned income, or 
receipt (directly or via cash) of transfers.
The second condition cannot be met without the first, but meeting the first 
is no guarantee of the second. For example, if drought wipes out household 
production and employment, then unless transfer payments (or direct food 
transfers) are available in practice as well as in theory, the absence of 
entitlements will prevent the afflicted households securing food even if it 
is physically available a few metres away.
The distinction between national and household food security is partly - 
but not wholly - the same as physical versus entitlement. National food 
security exists if production plus nationally financeable net imports plus 
food aid would allow providing entitlements (earned, produced, transferred) 
to all households and the national distribution (physical and transfer 
system) would allow getting it to the locations at which it is needed.
South Africa - like Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe - meets this test. 
Tanzania is a borderline case in drought years for financial reasons; 
Mozambique does not meet the test for both financial and physical 
distribution capacity reasons.
3At household level the physical access problem may be real. At the least, 
it may require moving from rural areas to urban to secure transfers - a 
migration which gravely prejudices rehabilitation of rural livelihoods and 
places additional stress and expense on food entitlement deficiency 
afflicted households. More generally, the problem is one of inadequate 
transfer entitlement systems. Both aspects are real in South Africa but 
the more serious is the transfer entitlement systems' inadequacy in 
coverage, delivery capacity and finance which is primarily an issue in the 
political economy of priorities. The weakness of physical and 
informational infrastructural capacity to deliver entitlements is largely 
consequential on the low priority given to defending the right to food .
The Economic Aspects of Food Security
Food security has several economic aspects:
■ Impact on gross domestic product (overall output)
■ Affect on number of secure, adequate livelihoods
■ Implications for external account balance (exports/imports)
■ Distribution of earned incomes, transfers, purchasing power
■ Political economic purposes and priorities
■ Moral economy.
Each is relevant to a greater or lesser extent in all countries but the 
balance varies. The lower the proportion of total output, of total 
livelihoods and of total external trade flowing from food production, the 
less the impact of the first three macro economic factors. Distribution is 
more generally relevant. High food prices relative to incomes and/or 
highly risky entitlements (e.g. because of drought inflicted loss of output 
and/or wage employment) can have very major absolute poverty impact even if 
food (or agricultural more generally) production is a relatively small 
proportion of external trade, the situation pertaining in South Africa.
Political economic considerations determine not only how much is allocated 
to transfer payments but to whom. In 1992-93, official South Africa 
drought relief transfer payments were about three quarters directed to 
sustaining the solvency of agricultural credit institutions and white
4farmers - i.e., not to food security as normally understood. On the other 
hand, Botswana's and Zimbabwe's allocations were about nine tenths directed 
via food rations, supplementary feeding through the health and education 
systems and special works programmes to provide earned (cash) income 
entitlements to buy food - i.e., they were targeted on providing a food 
security safety net. This divergence basically reflects the different 
priorities of the South African government (and especially the Ministry of 
Finance) from those of the Botswanan and Zimbabwean governments.
Moral economy is Adam Smith's term. He argued that no country could be 
great or prosperous the majority of whose people were poor and miserable. 
This can be argued on productivity (basic human social and economic 
investment) and macro purchasing power (poor households cannot provide 
large, dynamic, buoyant markets) grounds. However, Smith also saw it as a 
moral imperative. Further, he perceived a central duty of the state as 
providing an enabling environment in which people could become, be and 
remain free of absolute poverty - a perspective reflected in present World 
Bank thinking and operational directives (if not always in country 
programme priorities).
To a large extent these economic perspectives are complementary. There are 
trade-offs, but on the whole the moral economy case - which necessarily 
calls for a political economic agenda to reduce absolute poverty - is good 
production macroeconomics. The main exception relates to unempowerable (or 
structural) food insecure (and 'normally' insufficient) households. These 
are:
a. households with an inadequate ratio of labour power to members (hands 
to mouths);
b. households who are structurally unemployable (or employable/self­
employable only at very low productivity) because of macro and sectoral 
economic characteristics which cannot be transformed except over a 
substantial number of years, for example many largely un- or mal- 
educated township residents between 18 and 30 years of age.
The first group in South Africa - as in Southern and Sub-Saharan Africa 
more generally - comprises largely aged persons and households with no or 
inadequate pensions (state, former employer, family), crippled persons and 
their households and single working age member households with several
5dependents (in practice female headed households without substantial 
remittance incomes).
The second group in South Africa - again parallel to Southern Africa and 
SSA - comprises rural and urban households whom the present economic 
structure locks out of both recorded wage employment and those 
informal/small scale wage, household and self-employment activities which 
are of high enough productivity to yield decent incomes. These households 
- unlike the first cluster - can be provided with access to livelihoods 
(e.g. land reform and agrarian reform more generally, enhancing small scale 
production's productivity and links to larger economic units) but this is a 
slow process. For those who have missed out on education and been involved 
for years in violent struggle (whether as combatants in Angola, Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe or as "comrades" in South Africa's townships) employability is 
highly problematic.
A narrow economic case for providing food security (plus health and 
education) for the 60% to 70% of these persons who are children can be 
made. So, less confidently, can one be made out for the macroeconomic 
gains of enhancing market size. Beyond that (especially in respect to aged 
and crippled persons) the case is essentially a moral economy one. Up to a 
point one can make a case that grave food insecurity leads to social unrest 
and violence which are economically damaging, but absolutely poor and 
starving people rarely are able to overthrow regimes. How a society treats 
its least well off and least physically productive members tells a great 
deal about its capacity for reconciliation, solidarity, mobilisation and 
dynamic stability. One can say with a 19th Century economist of some note, 
that the problem with a major famine (in Ireland) was that it did not kill 
enough persons to make the economy viable, or one can stand with Adam 
Smith, the Old and New Testaments and Koran and the 1970s and 1990s World 
Bank on the moral economy issue. Or one can simply fail to face up to the 
choice which may be comfortable for an individual but when practiced by a 
state (as in South Africa) has devastating human consequences.
ood Insecurity, Food Insufficiency and Apartheid
Strictly speaking, food insecurity applies to persons/households/countries 
which in normal years do have adequate supplies of and entitlements to food 
but are at serious risk of losing them - to unemployment or access to land, 
drought or other calamities, terms of trade shifts (domestic or external)
6and/or war or other catastrophes. Persistent food insufficiency in 
virtually all years (structural absolute poverty) is not logically 
characterised as insecurity.
In practice, this division is often not made. Operationally severe food 
insufficiency especially at widespread, life threatening levels, is 
normally the focus of policy efforts and one which is both larger and 
higher on the political priority list when food insecurity has sharply 
raised the previous numbers of households with food insufficiency - as in 
the 1991/92 drought, 1992/93 food security crises in South and Southern 
Africa. Further, the Swahili proverb - give a rich man less food and he 
will grow thin; give a poor man less food and he will die - applies. These 
persons with moderate pre-existing food insufficiency (especially children 
and aged persons) are most at risk when food insecurity imposes greater 
cuts. In this paper food insecurity/insufficiency are addressed jointly.
But it does make sense to differentiate between calamity and/or catastrophe 
(natural and man-made food supply and entitlement crises) caused food 
insecurity and structural food insufficiency (absolute poverty) in 
analysing particular causes, policies and results. It is argued that land 
(more accurately agrarian since the main production and livelihood gains 
have come from making possible more production by black farmers on land to 
which they already had access) has not reduced food insecurity in Zimbabwe. 
If this means that in catastrophic drought years even family farmers with 
normally adequate livelihoods are at risk, of course it is true.
Similarly, if it means that the agrarian reform on existing access land has 
enabled up to a third of black farming households to achieve adequate 
livelihoods but has left at least a half at, near or below the absolute 
poverty line in normal weather years, that too is true. Neither point, 
however, is an argument against agrarian reform and the latter is in fact 
one in favour of land reform.
Similarly, the reality of a large number of chronically (the moral 
implications of saying "normally" rather argue against that term) food 
insufficient households, argue for a baseline transfer and a permanent 
earned entitlement enhancing programme for food security/adequacy with 
broader front transfer and future vulnerability reduction programmes in 
calamity/catastrophe years. In practice all years have some calamities - 
e.g. some areas in South Africa have been severely drought afflicted over
71992/1993 ensuring area specific food insecurity/famine risk in them over 
1993/1994. However, again there is a distinction between permanent, area 
specific emergency programmes and disaster years such as 1992/1993.
Neither absolute poverty nor calamities are simply emanations of apartheid 
and its extended family. Absolute poverty has been endemic in Africa (most 
notably geographically in Ethiopia and structurally for unempowerable 
households with weak extended family links) for several centuries.
Calamity and catastrophe-linked food insecurity and famine can be traced 
back as far as written and oral history go (not excluding Joseph's brethren 
and - an early food security success - Joseph's work as Governor of Egypt 
in establishing physical inter year grain reserves as recorded in the Old 
Testament). Absolute poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa ranges from perhaps 20% 
(excluding Seychelles, Mauritius and post-transfer entitlement Botswana) to 
over 60% (catastrophe afflicted Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and - probably 
- Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan) and food insecurity from drought is high in a 
majority of cases. South Africa at 30% to 35% in normal and 40% to 45% in 
calamity years is about 'average'; a devastating commentary on the 
political economy of a country whose per capita output is about five times 
the average.
However, while ending apartheid and its agnates is not a sufficient 
condition for food security, it is - in practice - a necessary one for 
starting and sustaining the long march toward it. Botswana and Tanzania 
(to take two countries with sharply divergent resource levels) have lower 
levels of food insecurity and - increasingly - of moderate and (especially) 
severe malnutrition than does South Africa. The reasons relate primarily 
to political economic priorities and political structures. Both 
leaderships have been concerned to reduce absolute poverty and hunger as 
both economic and moral imperatives. Most politicians are dependent on the 
votes of poor rural persons cast in competitive (whether multi or single 
party) elections. It is simply inconceivable that in 1992/1993 either 
would have made bailing out rural credit institutions its overriding 
priority in response to drought and the threat of famine as the South 
African regime could and did do.
Macro Economics And Food Security In South Africa
In respect to domestic output, meeting food security requirements purely by 
empowerment would in normal weather years entail an output increase at
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8urban retail food prices of the order of perhaps R 6,000 to R 7,500 million 
or about 2.5% to 3% of present gross domestic product. However, it would
not - in macroeconomic logic - necessitate any additional production of
food because in normal years food insufficiency at household level is 
purely an entitlement caused problem and in severe drought years imports 
can - at macro level - be financed.
The R 5,000 to R 6,000 million estimate is based on a rough estimate
(guesstimate) of 2 million to 2.5 million absolutely poor households 
needing on average R 2,000 to R 2,500 annually to reach the absolute 
poverty line, i.e., R 4,000 to R 5,000 additional cash or household self­
provisioning (so-called subsistence) income for absolutely poor households 
plus R 1,500 to R 3,000 salary and capital (including depreciation) linked 
output within the empowerment programmes.
At one level this is an underestimate of gains and an overestimate of 
costs. Neither land, labour nor capital stock in South Africa are anywhere 
close to full employment. Therefore, once the structural and investment 
requirements of the new production were met (no easy hurdles) a multiplier 
output gain could be expected.
At a different level, the output increase and more particularly the scope 
of a poor people's production enhancement approach is overstated because 
perhaps a third of absolutely poor households are unempowerable. They 
cannot escape absolute poverty primarily through additional earned income 
because their command over labour power is quantitatively and/or 
qualitatively insufficient. While enhancing their purchasing power would 
have a multiplier response, the direct transfer payments would have a 
neutral or negative (depending how financed) direct impact on output.
The calamity year output loss calculations are somewhat different. Because 
total agricultural output is well under 10% of GDP, even a once in a 
century drought (1991-1992) will have a direct negative impact on output of 
at most 2.5% to 3% and a total one (including negative multiplier impact) 
of perhaps 5%. In 1992 that probably meant the difference between 
potential growth of 1% to 2% and actual shrinkage of about 3%. How much 
effective food security strategies would reduce such losses - or more 
specifically their direct component as sustained entitlements would largely 
avert the multiplier loss - would depend on the balance between pure 
consumption support transfers and public works employment which did
9generate output (even though not of food). A reasonably effective, largely 
work for wages for food strategy could reduce it by at least half.
The livelihood (employment broadly defined) implications of/requirements 
for food security in normal years illustrate the problems rather more 
clearly than do the macro output ones. Excluding unempowerable households 
of the order of 1,500,000 to 1,750,000 houeholds need enhanced household 
incomes from more employed members and/or higher productivity and pay 
employment/self-employment by presently active members.
To define this requirement is virtually to admit that it can in practice be 
met only in a much more buoyant employment/livelihood context than has 
existed for a decade and a half. Further, the nature of the livelihood 
requirement strongly suggests that relatively labour intensive, household 
production (including, but not limited to, agrarian and land reform enabled 
small black family farming household production) would need to be a focus.
A 2|% to 3% increase in total output within the present physical, technical 
and economic parameters (even abstracting from apartheid - or considering 
post-apartheid considerations) would have a trivial effect on livelihoods 
of absolutely poor households and, therefore, on their food entitlements.
The drought downside impact probably had serious negative consequences for 
the livelihoods of 650 to 750 thousand households. Of the order of 450,000 
were year round agricultural wage employees fired, seasonal ones not hired, 
black family farmers, urban wage employees fired or working short time and 
self-employed or informal sector wage employed urban similarly seriously 
negatively affected by the multiplier effect. At a rough guess about half 
these households were absolutely poor pre-drought and were pushed from 
absolute poverty down to near or total destitution so that the overall 
increase in absolutely poor and food insufficient households was from
2,000,000-2,500,000 to 2,350,000-2,750,000 (about 40% to 45% of the 
national population and half the black population).
The impact of achieving an end to normal year food insufficiency on 
external account depends on the balance between additional 
production/incomes and transfer payments and on the make-up of the 
additional production. If all of the empowerment were through transfers 
and/or all the additional production was domestic market oriented (e.g. 
housing) the direct negative impact could be as high as R 1,500 million 
export loss (food redirected from exports to poor households) plus R 1,500
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million additional imports. Because South Africa's economy is - and will 
for the foreseeable future remain - external account constrained whenever 
output growth is buoyant, this would be an untenable direction to take in 
seeking to overcome absolute poverty. A structural external account 
worsening of nearly 2% of GDP is not acceptable.
However, if a substantial portion of the direct additional output were to 
be agricultural production by poor black family farmers and exportables (or 
somewhat less plausibly import substitutes and basic consumer goods) had a 
substantial weight in other production, then the external account effect 
could be relatively limited and within the capacity of a parallel export 
expansion strategy (needed in any event to bolster import capacity). Like 
the livelihood requirements, the external balance considerations do point 
to agrarian (as well as land) reform to enable black family farmers to 
raise overall output as well as their own incomes, i.e., not just 
substitute for the structurally economically non-viable one half to two- 
thirds of small and medium scale white farmers (who do not account for a 
similar proportion of agricultural output - perhaps a fifth to a quarter).
The drought crisis had a major negative direct external payments impact in 
1992. Agricultural exports (not all food) were R 2,000 million below what 
would otherwise have been achieved and additional food imports were over 
R 1,500 million higher.
The loss of output, entitlements and effective demand both reduced non-food 
imports (consumer, intermediate and capital) below what they otherwise 
would have been and probably pushed some output into the export market.
The deflationary (i.e. output constraining) policies of the Reserve Bank 
continued to squeeze imports and domestic demand (with at least some 
production switched to exports) in a way rather startling in the third year 
of depression and at least tenth of near stagnation and falling trend 
output per capita. In addition , the recurrent tendency to adopt policies 
contributing to creeping over-valuation of the rand represented another 
self-inflicted wound which could - and should - have been avoided.
The Economics of Distribution and Food Security
In normal weather years not marked by macroeconomic disaster, the economics 
of food security at household level are a mixed structural problem of 
distribution and redistribution. Distribution would empower the households
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to buy (or grow) food by creating an enabling environment in which they 
could raise their earned incomes; redistribution would provide transfer 
payments to achieve empowerment as far as expenditure, albeit not earned 
income, was concerned. For the perhaps two-thirds of absolutely poor 
households who are not unempowerable (aged, disabled, single adult headed) 
the distributional approach is preferable on macroeconomic, households 
self-respect, self-reliance and political/fiscal sustainability grounds.
For the unempowerable there is no real alternative to extended family, 
community, voluntary organisation and/or state financed redistribution.
In fact, the distinctions between distribution and redistribution and 
between empowerable and unempowerable are not as clear-cut as the above 
would suggest.
■ public works employment - if properly designed, managed and supported - 
is distributional more than redistributional, but has the fiscal and 
some of the political sustainability problems of redistribution.
■ nominally empowerable persons/households may be very hard to empower 
either for structural reasons (e.g. barriers to small scale, labour 
intensive production; lack of accessible child care facilities for 
female workers) or because of the characteristics of the potential 
workers (e.g. those who have received a smattering of formal non­
education after 1970 and a political mass action education not 
conducive to normal employment/self-employment patterns in the 1980s 
and 1990s).
The distribution/redistribution aspects of coping with maintaining food 
security during a calamity and of supporting restoration of 
livelihoods/reduction of vulnerability thereafter is, on the face of it, 
one of redistribution. That is a valid perception in the sense that 
finance has to come from the same sources and poses most of the same 
problems as consumption transfers, even if it takes a different form, e.g. 
work for food employment.
However, in a different sense there is a major difference. Work for food 
approaches enable households (especially rural ones) to remain in place and 
to maintain the dignity of being workers not dependent clients - both 
favourable to speedy livelihood rehabilitation. Further, they can provide 
valuable - especially to structural shifts toward environments more
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friendly to poor household income augmentation and small farm vulnerability 
reduction - infrastructure which is just as much production as any other 
type of infrastructure. The efficiency of this means of producing fixed 
capital depends largely on pre-calamity analysis, design and standby 
structure construction (whoever is to handle the physical operation - e.g. 
small scale construction teams for low cost housing, village councils or 
user committees for small scale irrigation and potable water provision). 
That there are problems is true, but the number of white elephant large 
scale infrastructure projects from the nuclear power plant to empty 
international conference centres underlines that they are by no means 
unique to this facet of/approach to infrastructure creation.
The bottom line problem in South Africa has - at one level - been finance, 
whether for traditional handouts of food or for a more efficient and 
complex strategic approach. In 1992/1993 with up to 750,000 families 
affected severely, needing perhaps R 2,000 each on average plus 
administration/delivery costs, even a straight food transfer scheme would 
have needed over R 2,000 million in addition to chronic food insufficiency 
alleviation. On the face of it, public plus private funding of total food 
assistance was of that order of magnitude suggesting perhaps 50% of the 
drought and 20% of the 'normal' requirements were met.
Political Economy And Moral Economy Issues
Government drought relief expenditure over 1992/1993 appears to have been 
in excess of R 5,000 million depending precisely what is put under that 
rubric. How then can it be said that under R 1,000 million actually went 
to alleviate food insecurity and - if so - why? The answers turn on the 
political economic priorities of the regime.
Apparently about 80% of the finance went to bail out rural credit providers 
(much of it on debt which was highly risky or worse before the drought) 
i.e., an exercise in financial institutional security enhancing. This did 
to a degree shore up the household economies of small and medium scale 
white farmers, many of whom are structurally unviable (and have a distinct 
lack of enthusiasm either for the present regime or for democratic 
transition), but probably only in the short run. In that sense it both 
renders agrarian reform harder and increases food insecurity in the medium 
term. Other analyses yield lower totals but, significantly, the same focus 
on bailing out white farmers and lenders to them not putting food into poor
13
black households cooking utensils. Much of the balance of the funding went 
directly to these farmers with nominal sub-allocation to their not 
retrenching permanent black workers (but not to their hiring seasonal 
ones). A certain amount was allotted to vulnerability reducing works - 
especially rural water - but not focused on hiring entitlement losers and 
in any event suddenly cut off when finance was redirected to the apparent 
overriding goal of cleaning up rural lending institution books.
Both the limited funds allocated, and the appallingly slow and complex 
means for actual food deliverer/distributors to gain access to it, 
underline that keeping adequate meals on poor drought afflicted household 
tables was very low on the regime's political economic priority list. The 
parallel proposals from a nominally liberal minister to limit free access 
to health care of poor households and to abolish universal (in principle at 
least) old age pensions underline that absolute poverty reduction is not 
only not a high priority but that its mechanics (or even the mechanics of 
not worsening it) have simply not been thought through.
It is tempting to assume that with the advent of a transitional government, 
or at least its successor under a new constitution, all such priority 
problems will vanish as speedily as Jo'burg's occasional snows do. True 
such a government would - perforce given its constituency - put absolute 
poverty reduction and calamity alleviation squarely on the agenda. But it 
too would have serious problems especially in respect to safety nets.
South Africa faces an overdetermined situation on the political economic 
front and one yet more overdetermined if reconciliation means great caution 
and only marginal action in redistributing away from far from poor (and, 
which is the point, in some cases far from unproductive) households and 
enterprises. Reconciliation's priority safety nets may well be for 
outgoing politicians and civil servants to avert de facto sabotage of 
transition and make affirmative action easier. Up to a point this may be 
resources well allocated - whatever the views one holds of the recipients.
Similarly, the urgent need to increase output, livelihoods, exports and 
investible (including human and social investment) surpluses does pose a 
competing claim on limited resources and one which is - or can be - based 
on raising the rate at which poor households become more productive and 
thus independently food secure. The only way to escape from an agonising 
overdetermination problem on the political economic prioritisation front
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would be to achieve a very rapid breakthrough to sustainable 8% annual 
growth with most of the proceeds directed to investment, to empowering poor 
households to produce more and to safety nets for unempowerable and 
calamity victim households. Unfortunately, no serious student of the South 
African economy views such a breakthrough as remotely possible in this 
century.
Therefore, a moral economy outlook shift is doubly necessary even if in the
actual and projectable resource availability context it cannot be
sufficient to do more than halt the growth in numbers of empowerable
absolutely poor households by - say - 1995 and reduce them up to - say - a
quarter or a third by 2000 while knotting up new strands to close the most 
egregious holes in both 'normal' and calamity safety net provision. That 
is not as defeatist an agenda as it may sound - it would mark a major shift 
in perspective, hopefully catalysed by the government but going well beyond 
it to communities, voluntary organisations, enterprises and non-poor 
households. Further, it would reverse negative trends which have endured 
now for at least a decade (somewhat disguised because the economically less 
weak minority of black South Africans have been able to win some real 
economic gains). A transformed perspective and a trend in the desired 
direction would be a foundation and structural frame for much more rapid 
building of food security/absolute poverty reduction over the first decade 
of the 2000s.
Related Issues: Environment, Population, Women, Children
Food security (insecurity) and environment - including ecological and 
livelihood sustainability - interrelate. Need - especially at absolute 
poverty/survival levels - is frequently ecologically devastating. If a 
household has the 'choice' of using practices (on cultivation and/or fuel 
collection) it knows damage the ecology and will be disastrous for future 
yields and practising 'sound husbandry' at the price of starving now, there 
is no choice.
It is both arrogant and ignorant to presume African farming households 
neither care about the land nor about future generations or even that they 
have no working knowledge of conservation and sustainability. It is the 
heritage of land theft, people-dumping and absolute poverty that forces 
actions predicated on present survival. The ways forward include:
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■ access to more land
■ and to complementary resources
■ together with supplementary off farm (or on farm
conservation/vulnerability reduction paid employment) livelihood inputs
■ as well as to additional knowledge and infrastructure conducive to 
environmental protection and restoration.
The medium sized white farming sub-sector is also environmentally damaging. 
Historically its practices have been unsustainable and land/pasture 
degrading. In the past decade as the sub-sector's economic viability 
(including "white living standards" for the owner) eroded and the debt 
servicing burden escalated, the pace of environmental damage rose. One 
case for land reform is that smaller, less capital intensive units not 
weighed down by either mechanisation costs or the need to cover - say - R
50,000 minimum, cash owner household consumption could afford to be rather 
more environmentally friendly.
Population is a politically as well as an economically explosive topic. 
Clearly, poverty in South Africa is not substantially the result of 
population growth and the per capita resource demands of the top 10% - and 
top 25% - of the population are quite disproportionate to those of the 
bottom 25% to 40% who face serious food insecurity and/or insufficiency.
However, reducing the adequate livelihood and entitlement gaps and 
mobilising resources for achieving universal access to basic social and 
human services (including food security safety nets for those who are 
unempowerable or calamity afflicted) are not made easier (to understate the 
case) by rapid population growth. South Africa is arguably not land short, 
it most certainly is both water and allocable surplus (for baBic services 
and productive investment) constrained.
But the response of making child spacing/family planning services available 
- even on a non-coercive, non-manipulative basis (far from the present 
situation) - is afflicted by tunnel vision. Yes, access to child spacing 
knowledge and material should be part of universal primary health services. 
But that is not enough and is not the area in which the most action is 
needed.
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Falling infant mortality, rising access to education (especially for girls 
and women), falling food insufficiency (and absolute poverty), rising 
access to old age security from sources other than surviving children are 
historically (and logically) linked to falling desired and actual 
birthrates and - with a lag - falling population growth. Enhancing food 
security can do more to reduce population growth (as well as being much 
less controversial) than universal access to pills and injections with no 
improvement in poor person nutritional entitlements.
Food security has clear gender aspects of at least two kinds. First, a 
higher proportion of food insufficient and insecure adults are women than 
men (perhaps 55% to 60% children, 25% to 30% adult women, 15% to 20% adult 
men). This is not primarily because of intra household mal-distribution of 
food, but because most large single adult households are female headed and 
because women earn less than men.
Second, women in the traditional division of labour and of budgetary 
responsibility have special responsibilities (primary in most rural 
contexts) for food, water and fuel, i.e., housekeeping including keeping 
cooked food on the table. Therefore, the burden of coping with chronic or 
crisis food shortfalls rests particularly grievously on poor women. In 
practice, water and fuel access and entitlement problems are closely 
correlated with those of food whether on the production and/or purchase or 
on the endemic scarcity/episodic calamity shortfall front.
Children comprise the majority of the food insecure and deprived. Because 
of lack of entitlements link to overall poverty this goes claw in claw with 
inadequate access to pure water, decent housing, warm clothing and heating 
and education. The present and future human and the future economic 
consequences are only too clear. South Africa may have a surplus of low 
quality labour maimed by lack of education, health and strength but it is 
increasingly short of well educated, energetic, high productivity 
economically active people. These costs are exacerbated by the fact that 
children are far less able to survive protracted hunger without permanent 
physical mental and emotional damage.
It should perhaps be pointed out that children are not a higher proportion 
of food insecure/absolutely poor households because these households are 
above average in size. On balance the reverse is true. But household 
income is not significantly correlated with the number of children.
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Therefore, at any absolute income level a higher proportion of households 
with more than two non-working members to one bread winner will be food 
insufficient or insecure and most non-working persons are children.
Further, rural households tend to be larger than urban (although this is 
perhaps more a consequence of apartheid than of modern Southern African 
social patterns - in Mozambique the reverse appears to be the case albeit 
perhaps as a consequence of apartheid's 1980s export of its brutal struggle 
for survival in the form of aggressive direct and proxy war). And rural 
households are more likely to be chronically absolutely poor (only partly 
because of white farmer exploitation and 'homeland' dumping) than are 
urban.
It certainly should be stressed that there is no road to healthy, happy, 
well-fed, fully educated, decently housed and clad children in absolutely 
poor households. Some programmes - in nutrition as well as health and 
education - can focus on children but the core of any realistic strategy 
(beyond a grab, dab and jab feeding/vaccination programme in a massive 
child death crisis situation analogous to Somalia 1992/1993) must turn on 
empowering and entitling households.
The same applies to women but with a difference. Empowering women requires 
equal access but effective equal access taking into account their pa B t  
disadvantages and their present homeworking workloads. These mean not 
ghettoizing "women's" issues in a 'femalestan' optic but relating 
programmes to the needs and capacities of those seeking empower­
ment/entitlements. It is no more sensible to suppose identical 
extension/input supply programmes meet male and female farmer needs equally 
than that similar homogenization for horticulturalists and pastoralists 
would make good sense. Similarly, health services for women should not be 
limited to stereotyped female and child aspects but should include them - 
neo-natal tetanus means that pregnant (or preferably all child-bearing age) 
women are priority recipients for tetanus toxoid vaccination; excessive 
workloads means that hypertension is likely to be as significant for women 
as for men.
Food Security, Water, Fuel, Health Services, Livelihood and Safety Nets
Food security must go beyond food. In the narrow sense this is true 
because water is a necessary complement of food, cooking a link between 
many raw foods and nutrition and inadequate preventative and simple
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curative (e.g. oral rehydration) health services frequently lead to health 
(ill-health) conditions reducing the nutritional impact of available food.
These considerations are particularly relevant in rural areas, during 
droughts and in the context of domestically displaced persons and refugees. 
In 1992 most internally displaced persons (and new Mozambican refugees) 
were fleeing drought, and two cities of 500,000 or more souls (Bulawayo and 
Beira) were on the brink of having to be evacuated before rains/riverain 
flows restored their water supplies. Similarly, drought reduces both the 
supply of collectable fuel and the cash available to buy alternatives 
(especially kerosine or coal) with disastrous ecological and workload 
(especially women's workload) impact.
Beyond these physical links is the economic structural one via 
entitlements. The largest cause of food insufficiency is inadequately 
productive and/or remunerated livelihoods and the second largest cause of 
food insecurity general economically mediated loss of livelihood. (The 
largest is drought linked loss of livelihood and the third largest has been 
and may still be forced population movement from employment or production 
friendly areas to the wastelands at the heart of most 'homelands'.) 
Livelihood creation and enhancement cannot, as a whole, be treated usefully 
as a sub-topic of food security but both food security and livelihood 
strategic formulation, programmatic articulation and implementation need to 
recognise the linkage explicitly and to run iterative consistency cross­
checks between the two sectors.
Safety nets (transfer entitlements) are also a topic in themselves, but one 
which needs close links with food security particularly in a calamity or 
catastrophe context. The non-crisis role of safety nets relates to 
unempowerable households (including single person households). Its basic 
components are old age pensions (as pioneered in SSA by South Africa but 
now rather more creatively used by Namibia) and cash transfer systems based 
on readily identifiable/testable unempowerability criteria (as in the
40,000 plus household Mozambican urban "food support" scheme). In these 
cases it is not evident that any administrative link to food security 
programming is either necessary or desirable. Certainly literal rations or 
even food stamps are on balance greatly inferior to cash transfers 
(preferably on a household basis and in the non-old age pension cases to 
its senior female member as the one basically responsible for keeping food
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on the table). The argument that recipients will waste the money is not 
borne out globally, by experience of Namibian and South African old age 
pension use nor by Mozambique "food support" financed spending (75% food, 
10-15% fuel and water, 5% soap, under 10% other including basic clothing). 
Absolutely poor households are not unaware of their needs and - at least in 
contexts where absolute poverty is common - what most are deprived of is 
neither common sense nor responsible conduct but material resources.
In calamity and catastrophe contexts safety net food security may need to 
be involved in food distribution, albeit the less it has to be so involved 
consistent with maintaining effective access/entitlement to food the 
better. If there is a working, non-oligopolised, commercial marketing 
system (including functioning transport) then ensuring adequate physical 
supplies (if from food aid it can be on-sold to the commercial sector) plus 
work programmes for afflicted households hopefully focusing on livelihood 
and infrastructural rehabilitation relevant to reducing future 
vulnerability to food insecurity (aB in the 1984/85 Zimbabwe programme) are 
optimal and to a large degree attainable.
Soup kitchens ("wet rations") may provide a screening device, appeal to 
humanitarian instincts and be quickly set up, but in other respects they 
are unsound. First, they are hard to create in rural areas and so force 
displacement to urban. Second, - even as opposed to dry rations, much 
less employment, i.e., "work for food" - they maximise dependence. Third, 
they gravely damage the commercial sector (not least its small scale and 
informal livelihood aspects). Fourth, they are cost inefficient - dry food 
is more fungible and less service intensive than wet, and cash more 
fungible than food. Their prevalence, and acceptance as a large scale 
permanent feature of, South African food insufficiency alleviation is both 
unusual and alarming.
The case for providing temporary employment is not disciplinary. It turns 
on enabling households to stay in place to rehabilitate their livelihoods 
(especially rural ones) for the post crisis period, preserving their self- 
reliance and self-respect (a public works job and a dish out of free meals 
are not at all the same thing), doing the least possible damage to commerce 
nd commercial transport, minimising distribution and bureaucratic costs, 
lisinq otherwise unemployed labour time on infrastructural and other 
work benefiting absolutely poor households and communities and - where
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possible (e.g. reafforestation, erosion control, water system improvement, 
small scale irrigation) - reducing future vulnerability to food insecurity 
causing calamities. The problems to be overcome are having a skeleton 
institutional structure and a shelf of types of project in hand (and 
ticking over on the local calamity business nearly certain to exist every 
year) ready to be put in gear when calamity strikes and the fact that 
useful work programmes do require complementary inputs and so cost more 
than pure cash or dry ration distribution (not necessarily than a 
fragmented soup kitchen approach with comparable coverage).
Toward Food Security: What Might Be Done?
Food security enhancement - both in itself and as an integral part of 
absolute poverty reduction - needs to be placed squarely on the political 
economic priority agenda of the transitional and constitutional government 
of South Africa. More generally, it needs - primarily by a moral economy 
case (argued on normative, social and political stability and economic 
grounds) to become central to South African political economic discourse 
and dialogue. Some progress has already been made on the second front 
among groups as diverse (and not automatically absolute poverty reduction 
oriented in practice) as trade union leaders (and members) and big business 
leaders (albeit, one fears, not middle level and shop floor management).
In tackling this challenge three caveats must be made:
■ no single measure can, by itself, 'solve' food insecurity and
insufficiency - an interlocking package approach will be needed
■ the prime target to 1995 has to be halting the rise in numbers of 
absolutely poor households and creating a minimally effective, broad 
access safety net for unempowerable and calamity stricken households 
with the 2000 goal a reduction of underlying absolute poverty to 20% to 
25% and achievement of calamity alleviation programmes comparable in 
coverage and quality to Zimbabwe's 1984/85 one and Botswana's rolling 
programmes - no speedy abolition of food insufficiency is attainable
■ efficiency - as an adjective relating to absolute poverty and food
insecurity food reduction goals not as an abstract ideological noun 
fronting for unregulated, manipulated marketism - is important. As 
Mwalimu Nyerere stressed, wasting resources (inefficiency) even in
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support of a commendable objective is a sin in a poor country. Good 
intentions deserve good analysis, competent resource deployment and 
incisive monitoring and review
The primary road to reducing food insufficiency has to be empowering poor
households to produce more. Components to such a strategy are relatively
well known:
■ agrarian reform providing small family sector farmers access to 
markets, to knowledge and extension, to research programmes tailored to 
their needs and capacities and to credit (as in Zimbabwe)
■ land reform providing landless or near landless households desiring to 
become family farmers, access (on affordable terms) to adequate and 
appropriate land
■ providing a similar enabling environment for non-crop family farm 
household incomes from handicraft and processing production, employment 
in nearby enterprises and/or state funded (not necessarily state 
operated) infrastructural and conservation oriented fixed investment
■ removing barriers to small scale and household non-farm enterprises and 
exploring what inputs of targeted training, technical assistance and - 
perhaps - credit guarantees would be facilitating to them as well as 
building up healthy sub-contracting or niche product (e.g. low income 
housing, small scale public buildings and works, uniforms and building 
furnishings) purchase links between large scale enterprises and public 
purchasing programmes and small scale enterprises
■ improving the quality (and coverage) not only of primary and applied 
secondary/tertiary education but also - perhaps especially - of 
applied, catch up (remedial) adult education to avert discarding the 
18-30 year old adults discarded, ignored or unprepared by post 
educational systems
■ achieving effective (without cost exclusions) universal access to 
primary health care especially preventative and educational - like 
applied education crucial to enhancing poor household productivity and 
earning power
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■ restructuring infrastructure provision and construction more generally 
toward cost (and employment) efficient labour intensive approaches both 
as major ongoing livelihood generation/enhancement instrument and as 
the main means to meet temporary food access protection/livelihood 
restoration/vulnerability reduction goals when calamities strike.
There is no doubt that each of these approaches - when related to poor 
households' self-perceived capacities and needs, to local contexts, to 
resource availability patterns and to practicable operational/managerial 
structures can and does work. The problems lie in coordinating a series of 
small scale decentralised activities within national guide-lines to achieve 
a coherent, broad front dynamic, of selling this approach to macro 
economists and financiers more used to large scale hard data policies (e.g. 
interest rates) or projects (e.g. hydroelectric dams) and of avoiding a 
high proportion of really badly designed or incompetently run activities at 
local level.
These instruments when coordinated into a poverty reduction strategy can be 
cost efficient in respect to livelihoods and output. It is likely that - 
including supporting human and social infrastructure - broad front three to 
five year rural livelihood enhancing programmes could at a gross cost of 
R 7,500 per household (excluding land and livestock purchases) enable up to
500,000 black households to become family farmers with livelihoods at or 
above the absolute poverty line. There is reason to suppose that many 
households would wish to participate in well-designed agrarian reform and 
could by the fifth year be generating additional incomes per household 
equal to at least half of the programmes five year gross expenditure with 
tax revenues from higher incomes/purchases covering related basic service 
and infrastructural maintenance costs and a potentially break-even external 
balance result.
Because enabling measures for similar urban livelihood enhancement are far 
costlier - and harder to design - such a recreation of a viable black 
family farming sector is a priority. It cannot 'solve' absolute poverty - 
it can enable perhaps 20% of presently afflicted households (about a third 
of empowerable ones) to climb out of it. Further, it is probable that less 
capital and - perhaps - bought input intensive family farming would be more 
economically viable than many pi ent capital and purchased input intensive
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white family farms which, without heavy continuing subsidies, are likely to 
go bankrupt.
The parallel to production enhancement is safety net provision. Again the 
basic building blocks are identifiable:
■ universal old age pensions (clawed back in the case of occupational 
pension recipients) at or above individual poverty line level
■ parallel severe disability pensions
■ income supplements for other unempowerable households with eligibility 
tests simple and objective and with a back-up community (religious, 
local government, voluntary) agency back-up for households not 
reachable by broad brush criteria screening techniques
■ work for food calamity offset programmes (including for workers 
directly or indirectly not hired, laid off and/or put on short time 
working outside agriculture) as a borderline instrument between 
production enhancement and food on the table underwriting consumption 
transfers.
Once again, functioning examples of each exist in Southern Africa. Their 
main limitation is coverage and, in some cases, unit costs preventing broad 
coverage particularly in countries with GDP of under $500 per capita per 
annum. While coordination and efficiency are serious barriers to achieving 
coordinated, goal promotion efficient programmes, the bottom line 
difficulty in South Africa is likely to be fiscal burden. Unlike the poor 
person production enhancing focus, this one (with the exception of work for 
food capital investment) does not have high enhanced output to programme 
cost ratios.
In Conclusion - Looking Ahead
Food security - including overcoming endemic food insufficiency - is an 
important production economic as well as livelihood and moral economic 
goal. In South Africa, which has both a high proportion of absolutely poor 
households in normal years and high calamity linked food insecurity risks, 
it is a central economic, as well as social and political, issue,
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Rough orders of magnitude are 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 absolutely poor 
households in non-drought crisis years - about 30% to 35% of the total 
population and up to 40% of the black population. (There are absolutely 
poor white households but probably under 1% of the white communities and of 
the overall absolutely poor household group.)
The number of households whose food security (entitlements) were severely 
impacted by the 1991/92 drought is of the order of 650,000 to 750,000; or 
up to 5,000,000 persons. Somewhat over half are rural family farm or 
agricultural worker households and the balance small town and urban area 
households hit by the macroeconomic consequences of the drought. Perhaps 
half these households were already in absolute poverty and have been pushed 
deeper into it. That implies an early 1993 level of 15,000,000 to
20,000,000 food insufficient households. This approaches 50% of the total 
population and may exceed half of all South African black people.
Because of the heritages of apartheid and its agnates, the economic 
structure - both through gross inequality (paralleled only by Brazil among 
middle income economies with substantial core industrial sectors) and also 
from patterns of production/technology/capital intensity - is ill-adapted 
to achieving rapid increases in food security through enhancing poor 
household livelihoods. A 5% overall growth rate within present production 
structures and patterns would certainly slow the growth of absolute 
poverty. It is doubtful it would halt, much less reverse, it.
Resource limitations have hampered calamity food insecurity mitigation and 
absolute poverty reduction. That will be true under any government, but 
has been even more pronounced to date because putting or keeping food on 
hungry/absolutely poor black household's tables is very low on the regime's 
political economic priority list, and only nominally does it subscribe to 
Adam Smith's moral economy imperative for the reduction of the proportion 
of poor and miserable households. (This is a racist heritage - its 1930s 
ancestors did give priority to the structural overcoming of white absolute 
poverty.)
Therefore, more resources are needed, but in parallel four other conditions 
need to be met:
■ public, private institutional and government understanding, acceptance 
and commitment to the moral economy case
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■ placing sufficiency and security of household food entitlements well up 
on the political economic priority agenda
■ finding out the needs, wishes and capacities of different clusters of
poor households (especially by asking them) as a basis for designing 
ways forward through more efficient service provision — production
enhancement - safety net - enabling environment
■ adopting absolute poverty reduction and calamity impact limitation
strategies backed by articulated programmes and policies (and by 
significant fiscal resources) which are integrated into and integral to 
overall economic strategy.
This is a twenty to thirty year perspective. But the initial stage is 
urgent and can be 12 to 24 months - achieving a workable coalition in 
favour of priority to act to achieve food security and sufficiency. Partly 
in parallel, a 36 month initial implementation could (given relatively 
rapid political and confidence transitions) lead to a halt in the growth of 
food insufficiency. By 2000 significant reductions in endemic absolute 
poverty and - especially - calamity related increases would then be 
possible. But the 1995-2000 reduction stage is possible only if the 1993- 
1994 agenda building/support mobilisation one begins to pick up momentum, 
mass support and visibility now.
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